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RECENT DECISIONS

JUDGMENTS - PROPRIETY OF FINDING THAT A NONPARTY CONDUCTED
THE DEFENSE - A patent infringement suit against a distributor was dismissed
on the ground that plaintiff's patents were invalid. A finding was incorporated in
the judgment that the defense had been "openly and avowedly conducted"
by the manufacturer of the article distributed by defendant. Plaintiff objected
that the finding "on its face would be a valid estoppel" in case plaintiff later
wished to sue the manufacturer in a separate suit. Held, that plaintiff was entitled to have the finding deleted from the judgment since the finding was not
necessary to a disposition of the issues between plaintiff and defendant. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. Thermoco, Inc., (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) II6
F. (2d) 845.
It is well settled that a person not a party to an action who "openly and
avowedly" takes over its defense is estopped by the judgment if plaintiff prevails.1 Similarly, if defendant succeeds, plaintiff is bound, and the third person
may plead res judicata to any later suit plaintiff brings against him involving
the same issues. 2 In the former class of cases, modern courts have often extended the rule to apply to cases where the nonparty's defense was known to the
plaintiff, even though not "open and avowed," 8 and, in a few instances, to
cases of secret defenses unknown to the plaintiff.4 The reason for the "open
and avowed" requirement in cases where plaintiff loses the first suit is that
without it plaintiff often would innocently bring a second suit only to find that
defendant is judgment-proof because of his secret participation in the first suit. 5
in the federal district court in New York to recover for injuries suffered in Pennsylvania that the question of whether or not the suit was "commenced" so as to toll the
Pensylvania statute was to be determined by the federal procedure under Rule 3,
rather than by the New York practice.
1 Lovejoy v. Murray, 3 Wall. (70 U. S.) I (1865); Beyer Co. v. Fleischmann
Co., (C. C. A. 6th, 1926) 1 5 F. ( 2d) 46 5 ; Dicks Press Guard Mfg. Co. v. Bowen,
(D. C. N. Y. 1916) 229 F. 193.
2 Cramer v. Singer Mfg. Co., (C. C. A. 9th, 1899) 93 F. 636; Jefferson Electric
Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co., (C. C. A. 3d, 1905)
139 F. 385.
8 Elliott Co. v. Roto Co., (C. C. A. 2d, 1917) 242 F. 941.
4 Universal Oil Products Co. v. Winkler-Koch Engineering Co., (D. C. Ill.
1939) 27 F. Supp. 161; Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. International Harvester Co.,
(D. C. N. J. 1940) 32 F. Supp. 304.
5 " • • • it is hard to require him [plaintiff] to throw good money and time after
bad by continuing his prosecution on the mere chance that a responsible party, whom
he might attempt to sue in another action on the same issues, is a secret defendant in
this suit." 39 CoL. L. REv. 1251 at 1252 (1939). A further reason for the "open and
avowed" restriction is that in the second suit plaintiff may plead differently or bring
forth evidence he did not think it necessary to use in the earlier action secretly de-
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This reason is not present in cases where plaintiff wins the .first suit, and the
"open and avowed" requirement is applied to such cases only because of the
doctrine of mutuality. 6 But, as in the .fields of consideration 7' and specific performance,8 the mutuality doctrine in the .field of res judicata has been attacked,9
and exceptions to the rule have arisen, notably in cases of derivative liability.10
The problem of open and avowed defense most frequently arises in patent litigation. A statement contained in the judgment to the effect that the nonparty
conducted the defense has been held proper in such cases,11 and, indeed, never
until the principal case has the propriety of such a recital even been questioned.
As to whether such a statement should be construed as a ".finding of fact" or
a mere "record of a fact," the cases are not clear, but the language of most
would seem to indicate that the latter construction is preferable.12 Judge Learned
Hand, speaking for the court in the principal case, said that a ".finding" of the
fact of open and avowed defense should not be contained in the judgment, since
it is not necessary to a disposition of the issues and therefore not conclusive befended by the defendant in the second suit. von Moschzisker, "Res Judicata," 38
YALE L. J. 299 (1929). But there is doubt whether it is equitable to let plaintiff so
experiment, by changing his theory or his evidence, and win from one defendant
who is not logically liable if the earlier defendant is not.
6 That is, no party can be bound by a judgment unless the opposing party wmtld
be bound if the judgment had gone the other way. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 32 S. Ct. 641 (1912).
7 I WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., 504-505 (1936).
8 WALSH, EQUITY 341-356 (1930).
9
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. International Harvester Co., (D. C. N. J. 1940)
32 F. Supp. 304.
10
Portland Gold Minning Co. v. Stratton's Independence, (C. C. A. 8th, 1907)
158 F. 63.
11 Eagle Mfg. Co. v. Miller, (C. C. Iowa, 1890) 41 F. 351; N. 0. Nelson
Mfg. Co. v. F. E. Myers & Bro. Co., (C. C. A. 6th, 1928) 25 F (2d) 659; Radio
Corporation of America v. E. J. Edmond & Co., (D. C. N. Y. 1927) 20 F. (2d)
929; Bidwell v. Toledo Consolidated St. Ry., (C. C. Ohio, 1896) 72 F. 10. These
cases can perhaps be reconciled with the principal case on the basis that in all of them
plaintiff prevailed on the merits in the original suit; for, as we have seen, the courts
have been more anxious to bar the nonparty when plaintiff wins than to bar the
plaintiff when defendant wins. 39 CoL. L. REv. 1251 (1939). And see cases in notes
2, 3, and 4, supra.
12
In N. 0. Nelson Mfg. Co. v. F. E. Myers & Bro. Co., (C. C. A. 6th, 1928)
25 F. (2d) 659 at 666, the court said that "The paragraph in question is not a finding
of fact, but merely a record of a fact." In Bidwell v. Toledo Consolidated St. Ry.,
(C. C. Ohio, 1896) 72 F. 10 at 14, the court pointed out that the manufacturer
"may have put itself in a position to estop it in subsequent litigation.•.• It will be
proper to determine that question when it arises." The court also stated that the decree
in Eagle Mfg. Co. v. Miller, (C. C. Iowa, 1890) 41 F. 351, "did not undertake to
bind them as a party defendant, but simply undertook to show such a state of facts as
would tend to estop them in subsequent litigation..••" Id., 72 F. at 13. The court
in the Eagle Mfg. Co. case had said it was "only stating, in set phrase, the force
which the decree would in fact have as against" the manufacturer. 41 F. at 358.
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tween the parties,18 and because defendant has no interest in this issue, since the
judgment has already estopped plaintiff from further suits against defendant on
these patents. The court then points out that, since it is improper to include
the recital as a :finding of fact, it should not be included as a record of a fact,
for it is misleading for a court to record a fact it does not decide, thereby
creating confusion by giving the record the "outward semblance of an estoppel." 14 It might be suggested that such a recital, though not a .finding, would
serve one useful purpose, as evidence of the fact that the defense was openly
conducted by the manufacturer, a fact which would be put in issue in a later
suit by plaintiff against the manufacturer.15 In a vigorous dissenting opinion,
Judge Clark argued that the defendant does have an interest in the issue, since
it is an agent bound to safeguard the manufacturer's rights and since it is
"vitally concerned" in whether its goods are subject to patent attacks before it
receives them. Just why it is so "vitally concerned" is not easy to see. Nor is it
clear on what theory such an agent's duties should extend to make it bound to
defend patent claims against its principal. A better basis for :finding an interest
might be founded on a pragmatic approach to the problem. If defendant does
not have an interest, it would not have contested plaintiff's appeal unless someone else who does have interest, i.e., the manufacturer, has taken over the defense
for it. The chief ground of the dissent, however, is that postponement of the
issue of open and avowed defense would not only constitute an invitation to
future litigation "barred in fact but unadjudicated in form," but also would
be bad administration of justice, since the evidence on the issue is most on hand
when the original judgment is entered, not in some later suit. The trial judge
in the instant action is certain to be better informed as to the manner in which
the defense was conducted than the trial judge of some later action. But this,
in its last analysis, is merely an argument for calling all suits proceedings in rem,
binding against the world, regardless of the requirements of jurisdiction over
18
See Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U.S. 254, II S. Ct. 773 (1891), and Radford
v. Myers, 231 U.S. 725, 34 S. Ct. 249 (1914), to the effect that a judgment should
not contain findings not necessary to a disposition of the issues between plaintiff and
defendant. In the principal case the court said that the only issues involved were the
validity of the patents, whether the apparatus infringed, and whether defendant sold it.
14
Principal case, II6 F. (2d) at 847. The court suggested that if the manufacturer wished to take advantage of the judgment, he should have availed himself of
Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, dealing with rights of interveners in
actions. However, it is by no means certain that he could have become a party, for the
application must be timely and intervention is permissive only. The court's suggestion
that if the manufacturer were not permitted to become a party, he should not enjoy
the privilege of a party, is in effect an advocation of the abandonment of the whole
rule of estoppel by judgment against nonparties openly conducting the defense.
A further difficulty with this suggestion is that the manufacturer would be reluctant actually to intervene, since he would never know whether it would be to his
advantage or detriment to make himself a party until final judgment was entered, for
the judgment, if adverse, would bind him as a party.
15 It should be noted, however, that if it were made the duty of the judge to investigate and record this fact in all cases, his record, whether a part of the judgment
or not, would be admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. See, 5
W10MoRE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., § 1639 (1940).
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parties, issues, and subject-matter. Further, to say that the issue of open and
avowed defense was fairly and effectively adjudicated by the lower court is to
forget that by its very nature the issue could not have arisen until judgment was
entered, since it is the nonparty who will desire to plead and put forth evidence
of open and avowed defense. Finally, since it is a question of jurisdiction, not a
question of substance going to the merits, this finding, if left in the judgment,
will not prevent another suit against the manufacturer, for judgments entered
without jurisdiction over parties and issues are subject to collateral attack at any
•

16

tune.

David N. Mills

16 Mellon v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., (C. C. A. 8th, 1915, 1917) 225 F.
693, 240 F. 359; Ritchie v. Sayers, (C. C. W. Va. 1900) IOO F. 520; Essanay Film
Mfg. Co. v. Kane, 258 U.S. 358, 42 S. Ct. 318 (1922).

